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Abstract
The diffusion of outsourcing, both national and international, and
vertical FDIs among manufacturing firms, along with the higher integra-
tion of business services in manufacturing, has recently led to question
the empirical evidence supporting the Deindustrialisation/Tertiarisation
(DT) hypothesis. Rather than a “real” phenomenon, it has been argued,
DT would be an “apparent” one, mainly due to the reorganization of
production across national and sectoral boundaries.
The empirical studies that have dealt with the topic so far have
not been able to effectively rule out such possibility, because of two
main limitations: the sectoral level of the analysis and/or the national
focus. In order to overcome them, the paper carries out an appreciative
investigation of the actual extent of the DT occurred in the OECD
area over the ’80s and the ’90s by moving from a sector to a subsystem
perspective, thus retaining both direct and indirect relations, and by
referring to a “pseudo-World” of 7 OECD countries, thus taking into
account the “global” dimension of the phenomenon.
The results strongly support the DT hypothesis: although the weight
of business sector services in the manufacturing subsystem increased,
acting as a counterbalancing tendency to the manufacturing decline,
subsystem shares significantly decreased, thus confirming DT as a more
fundamental trend of modern economies.
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1 Introduction
Although it dates back to the early ’40s, the hypothesis that economic
development passes through the binomial Deindustrialisation/Tertiarisation
(DT) has been recently brought to the front of the debate. In spite of
the several buzzy-words – such as “new-economy”, “knowledge-economy”,
“learning-economy” – and conceptualization attempts (Foray, 2000), the
current techno-economic paradigm appears incontrovertibly more service-
based than the previous ones. Indeed, some consider this the only feature
of modern economies which might be properly regarded as “new” (e.g.
Daniels, 2004). Not only is a service sector such as that of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) pivotal in driving economic activities
and performances nowadays (Di Pilat, 2003); but services, both in general
and in particular fields – such as the so called Knowledge Intensive Business
Services (KIBS) (Tomlinson, 2000) – are re-shaping economic fundamentals,
both from the demand and the supply-side.1
In the current techno-economic paradigm, therefore, quantifying and
evaluating the actual impact of DT processes have become more important
than ever. Notwithstanding, the results of those empirical applications which
have been carried out with this scope are far from conclusive and rather
seem to point out different dynamics for different kinds of service sectors.
Apparently, rather than more deindustrialised and tertiarised, modern devel-
oped economies would simply appear more specialized in different kinds of
services than before. The so-called Clark-Fisher hypothesis, which assumes
that economic development is characterized by a shift from agriculture to
manufacturing and from this to services, would thus not properly fit the
new-economy paradigm.
The present paper aims at showing that the “invalidity” of the Clark-
Fisher hypothesis should not be taken for granted either. The arguments
which have been used to support it – briefly reviewed in Section 2 – are in
fact affected by a crucial methodological flaw. In brief, as they are based on a
sectoral view of economic systems, they disregard the actual shares of labour
employed, and value created, in activities intended, directly and indirectly, for
the production of manufactured goods or the provision of services delivered to
final demand. Furthermore, the sector-based approach to the DT hypothesis
is extremely sensitive to the hypotheses made about the organization of
production and, accordingly, it is not reliable in spatial/temporal contexts
in which the actual one is different from that assumed (as it is currently the
1As for the former, Sherwood (1994), for instance, claims that services in the “new
economy” have made the role of the consumer prominent, given his active involvement in
service provision. As for the supply-side, instead, Andersen and Corley (2002) have pointed
out, among others, that standard measures of productivity and economic performance
are no longer satisfactory, given their inadequacy to properly figure out productivity and
output in services.
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case).
On the basis of this argument, in Section 3, a subsystem approach
originally developed by Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982a,b) is suggested
as a superior alternative in investigating the structural change of modern
developed economies.
As a major value added of the paper, this subsystem approach is then
applied in an original manner, described in Section 4, to investigate the
extent of DT processes occurred over the ’80s and the ’90s in an “artificial”
World made up of a consistent aggregation, dictated by data availability, of
seven OECD countries – Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Japan, UK
and USA – together accounting for almost half of the World GDP at PPP.
The special features of this empirical application allow us to disentangle
the multiple and different mechanisms which underpinned the structural
change of this developed part of the World in the last two decades.
Indeed, as we fully argue in Section 5, although the weight of business
sector services in the manufacturing subsystem increased, acting as a coun-
terbalancing tendency to the manufacturing decline, the labour and value
added shares of the latter subsystem in fact decreased considerably. Such
a decrease was even more marked than the sectoral one, and apparently
not explained by the increasing resort of the OECD7 to international trade.
Moreover, the same decline does not seem to have been fully accounted by
the increase of the integration of manufacturing in the service subsystems
which, possibly in the light of the ICT diffusion, has paralleled the increased
integration of services into manufacturing.
Section 6 recapitulates the main points of the paper and envisages future
research lines for it.
2 The DT hypothesis: old and recent evidences
Since Clark’s (1940) major contribution, deindustrialisation (D) – defined as
the decline of manufacturing shares of both employment and value added
in economic systems — has been usually regarded as a general tendency of
economic development, strictly connected with tertiarisation (T), that is,
the increase of the shares accounted by the so called “tertiary”.2
This tendency has been related by economists to both demand and
supply-side factors, pointing to, respectively, the higher income elasticities
and the lower pace of the productivity increase of services with respect to
manufacturing. Which of these factors should be given the major role has
not been ascertained yet.3
2This tendency is commonly referred to as the Clark-Fisher hypothesis. As is well
known, Clark terms the tendency “Petty’s Law” and, relying on a passage of Political
Arithmetick (1676), credits Petty for having first suggested it.
3Some have claimed that demand-side factors are the most prominent (e.g. Clark, 1940;
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To be sure, not only are the determinants of DT still debated, but also
its actual extension has been and is still subject to empirical investigation.
Clark himself, for first, seventeen years after having suggested the relative
hypothesis, actually questioned it in the third edition of The Conditions of
Economic Progress (1957). Indeed, he there observed that most of the results
achieved for the tertiary as a whole did not hold if services were in fact
subdivided into producer and consumer ones: on the one hand, there were no
evidences of high income elasticity for consumer services; on the other hand,
there had been great improvements of efficiency in some producer service,
such as transport and trade.
The importance of the latter in explaining the sectoral patterns of change
in modern economies, and DT in particular, was thus highlighted.4 On its
basis, for example, Gershuny (1978) criticized the well-known Bell’s (1973)
idea of the “post-industrial society” as a service economy, by opposing
to it that of a self-service economy. As he argued, this is characterized,
on the one hand, by an increased number of domestic and individually
purchased durable goods in households that eliminate the dependence on
outside provided services; on the other hand, by an increased industrial
production requiring an increased service support sector (like advertising,
marketing, financial and insurance services).
A similar argument was put forward later on by Stanback (1979, 1981)
who, by disaggregating services into consumer, producer and public ones,
did not find “significant trend away from goods and toward services in the
pattern of consumer expenditure, but rather that the purchases of many
goods and services are closely linked.” (1979, p.16). By using data on
interindustry transactions, he identified a remarkable growth of producer
services, which he related to: the consolidation of smaller firms into larger
units, the increased government regulation of the economy, the increase of
market size and their expansion into international markets.5
An important point made by Stanback concerns the hypothesis that,
the greater the range of services firms are able to provide is, the higher
will be the probability of contracting-out them, thus accelerating the pace
of producer services growth, in a sort of self-reinforcing process. Indeed,
this is what has occurred recently with the widespread diffusion of service
Rostow, 1959, 1990; Pasinetti, 1993), whereas others have played down the role of demand
and rather retained supply-side factors as critical (e.g. Stigler, 1956; Kuznets, 1957; Fuchs,
1964, 1965; Baumol, 1967). In a recent empirical analysis, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy
(1997, 1999) find some evidence supporting the latter. The question is still very debated,
but not directly relevant to this paper’s aim.
4Apart from Clark’s (1957) insights, it was Greenfield (1966) who first suggested
distinctly the dichotomy producer/consumer services.
5Original explanations are also provided by Stanback (1979) for the destiny of consumer
services, in particular in terms of: complementarity between services and consumer goods;
rigidity of the constraints to time for consumption; questionability of the increase of
leisure-time.
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outsourcing practices. A phenomenon which has shifted the attention on
the actual integration of services in manufacturing, with the related possible
overestimation of the actual decline (increase) of manufacturing (tertiary).
The point – already dealt with in the ’80s by Momigliano and Siniscalco
(1982a,b) – has been recently addressed by Domberger (1998), who showed
that the only services exhibiting long-term proportional growth for six OECD
countries have been those usually intended for intermediate consumption
(Domberger, 1998, p.186). The same issue has been investigated by McCarthy
and Anagnostou (2004) who, by using a decomposition method put forward
by Dietrich (1999), identified an overestimation of DT for the UK over the
’80s and explained it in terms of an increased integration of services into
manufacturing.6
The DT hypothesis becomes even more blurred when the increasing
resort to international trade and the upsurging international fragmentation
of production (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990) are considered. In particular,
although the latter apparently fuels DT, the delocalization of manufacturing
processes abroad and the localization at home of service based activities in
fact does not strictly amount to it, because it involves simply a reorganization
of production across national boundaries, but no change in terms of overall
economic structure.
Following these lines of argument, a sort of consensus is emerging about
a counter-DT hypothesis, which sees it as “superficial” rather than “real”.
As Postner (1990) puts it, much of the observed surge of producer services
could merely be a “superficially different way for business to operate and
can be reasonably explained within the economic literature on industrial
organization. An extreme version of the argument claims that no new
producer services employment, particularly business services employment,
have really been created in recent years” (1990, p.178).
3 The DT hypothesis reconsidered: from a sector
to a subsystem perspective
Although it gives extremely useful insights, the bulk of evidence on an
apparent “superficial” DT hypothesis suffers from a crucial methodological
drawback. As noted by Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982a,b) more than
two decades ago, in all these works “producer services are defined as those
services mainly intended for intermediate demand, and consumer services as
those mainly intended for final consumption” (1982a, p.276). In so doing,
the economy is disaggregated into sectors – usually following standard SIC
definitions – by assuming demand, output and technology within each sector
homogeneous enough to retain each and every one of them in “relative
isolation from the rest” (Georgescu Roegen, 1971).
6For a critical analysis of this decomposition technique see Vittucci Marzetti (2006).
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This hypothesis has two relevant implications for the analysis of DT.
Firstly, it amounts to assuming intra-sectoral relationships stronger than
intersectoral ones. In other words, sectors are dealt with as if they were
vertically integrated models of production: the intermediate inputs of a
certain sector are not regarded as produced means of production, but rather
as products external to the sector itself, with respect to which the latter
has no role to play, either directly or indirectly, while this is not the case
at all.7 Secondly, the sectoral view of the economy is extremely sensitive
to changes in the way firms within sectors actually organize the production
process, which could be erroneously taken for structural kinds of changes.
Thus, for instance, if some business activities previously performed “in
house” by manufacturing companies are simply re-organized, and thus “hived
off” to specialist subcontractors, all things equal, this makes service sector
shares increase, while the manufacturing ones decline, suggesting an apparent
tertiarization.
While possibly not so crucial in the past techno-economic paradigms,
these two implications seriously hamper the analysis of DT in the present
scenario. On the one hand, in the so-called “knowledge-economy”, the wide
spread of ICTs has made horizontal linkages among sectors no less important
than vertical ones. On the other hand, the increasing resort to outsourcing
practices has dramatically changed the actual organization of production, at
least in the OECD area (e.g. Domberger, 1998).
In the attempt of overcoming the limitations of such analysis of DT, and
thus measuring the real weight of manufactured goods and service provision
in the economic system, we here suggest shifting to a different perspective
and referring explicitly to the idea of economic vertical integration.8 This
is what, in an article which is much more quoted than used, Momigliano
and Siniscalco (1982a,b) for first have done in investigating the structural
change of the Italian economy from the middle ’60s to the middle ’70s. More
precisely, in order to detect its actual degree of tertiarisation in the light
of the service integration in manufacturing, they referred to the concept of
subsystem by building up a matrix such as:
(1) B = qˆ−1(I−A)−1yˆ
7On this point see, for instance, Baranzini and Scazzieri (1990).
8The genesis of vertical integration can be traced back to William Petty (1662) and
Adam Smith (1776), who extensively, though still somewhat implicitly, used such “logical
device” (Scazzieri, 1990, p.20). However, starting from the seminal notion of subsystem put
forward by Sraffa (1960), it was only in the late ’60s that the concept of vertical integration
was analytically studied by, among the others, Pasinetti (1973), who developed the concept
of vertically integrated sector, a compact representation of the productive system suitable
for dynamic analyses. Since then on, such tools have been mainly utilized in empirical
studies on productivity, as those by Gossling (1972) and Gupta and Steedman (1971) and,
more recently, by Wolff (1985), Milberg (1991), Panethimitakis (1993) and De Juan and
Febrero (2000).
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where qˆ is the diagonalized vector of gross production, A is the matrix
of domestic flows-based input-output coefficients and yˆ is the diagonalized
vector of final demand.
Each row of B adds up to 1 and shows “the proportion of the activity
of each branch which comes under the various subsystems”(Momigliano
and Siniscalco, 1982a, p.281).9 B can therefore be used as an operator
to reclassify any magnitude from sectors into subsystems. Indeed, on the
basis of B, Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982a,b) worked out the matrix N,
which is crucial in the actual investigation of DT processes from a subsystem
perspective, defined as:
(2) N = lˆB
where lˆ is the diagonalized vector of labour inputs. The generic element
nij of N actually gives the amount of labour required, both directly and
indirectly, from sector i in order to satisfy the final demand addressed to
sector j.
Extremely relevant, for the same scope, is also the matrix C, which is
obtained from N by dividing each of its cells by the total of the correspondent
column. Denoting with i′ a row unit vector, C can be written as:
(3) C = N(î′N)−1
The generic element of C, cij , measures the share accounted by sector i in
the total labour required by subsystem j in order to produce the output
needed to satisfy its final demand.
It is worth emphasizing that, as demonstrated by Rampa (1982), all the
previous matrices are invariant to relative prices.10
Moreover, it is important to note that a comparative analysis of the
changes occurred in the above defined matrices can prove useful for disen-
tangling structural change determinants. Indeed, while N works out levels,
B and C report shares and do not depend on, respectively, sectoral labour
productivities and final demand structures. B calculates the shares of each
9As noted by Rampa (1982), given that B depends not only on strict technological
factors, but also on the structure of final demand, it cannot be taken as an indicator of
technological change as such.
10Denoting with x¯ each magnitude x expressed in physical quantities and with pˆ the
diagonalized vector of prices, we can write:
B = qˆ−1(I−A)−1yˆ =
=
(
ˆ¯q−1pˆ−1
) (
I− pˆA¯pˆ−1)−1 (pˆˆ¯y) =
=
(
ˆ¯q−1pˆ−1
) (
pˆ
(
I− A¯)−1 pˆ−1) (pˆˆ¯y) =
= ˆ¯q−1
(
I− A¯)−1 ˆ¯y
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Source: World Economic Outlook Database, 2005.
Figure 1: OECD7 share of World GDP at PPP
subsystem on the total hours worked in the relevant sector and changes of
the total employment in the sector, keeping constant its gross production,
do not affect these shares. On the contrary, assuming constant returns of
scale, C is not affected by changes in the composition of final demand (on
this point see Montresor and Vittucci Marzetti, 2007). Thus, B changes are
mainly related to non proportional dynamics of final demand, whereas C
variations to that of sectoral labour productivity.
Drawing on the present subsystem view, in the following we will apply
these and others indicators in an original empirical investigation of the DT
hypothesis in the OECD area from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s. Before
illustrating its main results, the methodology of this application is worthwhile
discussing at first.
4 The DT hypothesis in the OECD7: an
“aggregated” sector/subsystem analysis
The empirical application we have carried out has several elements of origi-
nality. First of all, rather than focusing on one country at a time, or on some
countries comparatively – as the majority of the studies does – we attempt
to estimate the extent of the DT hypothesis at an aggregated level: that is,
by considering the economic sectors and subsystems of a “pseudo-World”,
made up of seven OECD countries – that is, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
France, Japan, UK and the US – together accounting for almost half of the
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Table 1: International trade integration of the OECD7
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Manufacturinga 46.1 45.4 44.6 45.3 45.1 43.9 43.3 43.8 44.5
Totalb 44.2 43.5 43.0 43.6 43.6 42.5 42.0 42.6 43.6
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database, 2006.
a∑7
i=1
∑7
j=1(X
m
ij+M
m
ij )∑7
i=1
∑
j(X
m
ij+M
m
ij )
× 100, where Xmij is the export of manufactured goods from
country i to j, Mmij is the import of manufactured goods from country j to i, and the
countries are ordered in such a way that the first seven belong to the OECD7.
b∑7
i=1
∑7
j=1(Xij+Mij)∑7
i=1
∑
j(Xij+Mij)
× 100, where Xij is the export from country i to j, Mmij is the
import from country j to i, and the countries are ordered in such a way that the first seven
belong to the OECD7.
World GDP at PPP (see Figure 1). Although the choice of the countries has
been mainly determined by reasons of data availability, these 7 economies
are actually quite integrated at the international level. Indeed, the average
international flows intra OECD7 amounted to about 45% of the total ones
(Table 1). Accordingly, while it (deliberately) neglects country specificities,
on the other hand, the present analysis allows us to appreciate the extent
at which DT processes have occurred on a (pseudo) global scale: in the
globalisation era, this actually seems to us a proper level of investigation of
the phenomenon.
A second element of originality, at least as far as an input-output data
based application is concerned, is its time coverage, which spans, although
across discrete sub-periods, from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s. By crossing
the “old” with the “new” OECD Input-Output Database (1995, 2005), and by
combining them consistently with data on sectoral hours worked – obtained
from the 60-Industry Groningen Growth and Development Centre Database
(2005)– we have thus been able to examine the structural changes brought
about in the OECD7 by the upsurge of the knowledge-base economy.
Third, the analysis is carried out by using domestic intersectoral flows
as a baseline, but controlling for the role of changes in international trade
along with that of the degree of vertical integration at the subsystem level.
In particular, data on imports and exports of manufactured goods – from
the OECD STAN Database (2004) – and on country GDP at current prices
– from the World Economic Outlook Database (2005) – have been used to
calculate the trade balance of manufactured goods as a percentage of country
GDP from 1980 to 1998.
This multiple and consistent integration of datasets, combined to check
for alternative explanations of DT, represents the last, but not least, added
value of the present application.
In detail, for each of the 7 countries, the matrix N (Equation (2)), based
on labour inputs, has been first worked out for four periods: early ’80s,
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middle ’80s, early ’90s and middle ’90s.11 For the sake of a DT analysis, the
data have been then aggregated in order to obtain six different macro-sectors
with the relative subsystems: primary (1-14 ISIC Rev.3), manufacturing
(15-37), public utilities (40-41), construction (45), business sector services
(50-74) and non-market services (75-99). Finally, the absolute values of N
have been simply summed up across countries to obtain the correspondent
values for the whole set, that is for the OECD7.12
After having worked with employment data, in order to analyze the
process of value creation at the subsystem level, a similar procedure has been
followed for sectoral value-added data (v). The B operators at the country
level have been thus pre-multiplied by the correspondent diagonalized vectors
(vˆ):
(4) U = vˆB
The generic element uij of U gives the contribution of sector i to subsystem
j in terms of value added.
Given that we are dealing with values, in order to obtain the correspondent
aggregate matrix for the OECD7, in this case it is not possible to simply
sum up the different country results as before. Therefore, by using the data
from the World Economic Outlook Database (2005), country’s shares have
been weighted by using PPP. Thus, for instance, denoting with sji the share
of sector (or subsystem) j with respect to the total value added of country
i and with $Yi the GDP based on Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) of the
same country, the correspondent share for the whole set of OECD countries
(sjOECD7) is equal to:
(5) sjOECD7 =
∑
i
sji
$Yi∑
i $Yi
5 The OECD7 over the ’80s and the ’90s: “DT
or not DT”?
5.1 Has the OECD7 actually become more
deindustrialised?
At first sight, from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s, our OECD7 has actually
undergone a sustained DT process. When both direct and indirect effects
are retained at a subsystem level, the manufacturing decline appears more
11In order to avoid, as much as possible, distortions coming from sectoral aggregation,
calculations have been carried out at the maximum level of disaggregation compatible with
the data at country level and the results have been then re-aggregated. For details about
the definition of the four periods see Appendix A.
12Let us observe that this is possible given that data on labour inputs refer to such a
homogeneous variable as hours worked.
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Table 2: Hours worked by sector/subsystem in the OECD7
early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary Sector 37,700,172 33,723,454 29,307,863 24,629,501
(-3,976,719) (-4,415,591) (-4,678,362)
Subsystem 13,895,862 12,611,489 11,793,032 10,035,300
(-1,284,373) (-818,457) (-1,757,732)
Manufacturing Sector 106,179,748 104,728,629 104,452,384 97,238,631
(-1,451,119) (-276,244) (-7,213,754)
Subsystem 136,112,879 136,122,350 132,649,492 119,782,561
(9,470) (-3,472,858) (-12,866,931)
Public Utilities Sector 4,242,153 4,332,810 4,472,372 4,207,845
(90,656) (139,562) (-264,527)
Subsystem 4,681,344 4,328,551 4,631,808 4,573,702
(-352,793) (303,257) (-58,107)
Construction Sector 36,238,076 36,363,778 40,420,758 42,798,288
(125,702) (4,056,980) (2,377,530)
Subsystem 59,049,399 57,049,589 61,710,582 61,041,902
(-1,999,811) (4,660,994) (-668,680)
Business services Sector 179,101,746 195,239,286 214,688,898 237,355,549
(16,137,539) (19,449,612) (22,666,651)
Subsystem 147,735,188 164,696,060 176,995,039 194,607,392
(16,960,871) (12,298,980) (17,612,353)
Non market services Sector 105,924,143 111,075,352 125,590,539 133,760,729
(5,151,209) (14,515,187) (8,170,190)
Subsystem 107,911,366 110,655,270 131,152,861 149,949,687
(2,743,904) (20,497,591) (18,796,826)
Total 469,386,039 485,463,307 518,932,814 539,990,543
(16,077,268) (33,469,506) (21,057,730)
Source: OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database.
intensive than at the sectoral level. In terms of total hours worked, the share
of the OECD7 manufacturing subsystem has decreased by 6.82 percentage
points, while, during the same period, the sectoral share of manufacturing
decreased of only 4.61% (Table 3). A similar result can be identified in terms
of value added, with respect to which the manufacturing subsystem shifted
from a share of 29.57% of the total value created in the early ’80s, to a share
of 22.86% in the middle ’90s: a decrease of 6.71 percentage points vs. a
sectoral one of only 4.58 points (Table 4).
To be sure, as far as hours worked are concerned, not only was the
decline in relative terms, but also in absolute ones. Indeed, while the total
hours worked in the OECD7 from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s increased
continuously, the hours worked in manufacturing decreased (Table 2).
This is a first important result of our application. When horizontal
linkages are allowed for along with vertical ones, the (pseudo-)World seems
to have been affected by an actual deindustrialisation process, both in terms
11
Table 3: Sectoral and subsystem shares of the OECD7 total economy (hours
worked)
early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary Sector 8.03 6.95 5.65 4.56
(-1.09) (-1.30) (-1.09)
Subsystem 2.96 2.60 2.27 1.86
(-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.41)
Manufacturing Sector 22.62 21.57 20.13 18.01
(-1.05) (-1.44) (-2.12)
Subsystem 29.00 28.04 25.56 22.18
(-0.96) (-2.48) (-3.38)
Public Utilities Sector 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.78
(-0.01) (-0.03) (-0.08)
Subsystem 1.00 0.89 0.89 0.85
(-0.11) (0.00) (-0.05)
Construction Sector 7.72 7.49 7.79 7.93
(-0.23) (0.30) (0.14)
Subsystem 12.58 11.75 11.89 11.30
(-0.83) (0.14) (-0.59)
Business services Sector 38.16 40.22 41.37 43.96
(2.06) (1.15) (2.58)
Subsystem 31.47 33.93 34.11 36.04
(2.45) (0.18) (1.93)
Non market services Sector 22.57 22.88 24.20 24.77
(0.31) (1.32) (0.57)
Subsystem 22.99 22.79 25.27 27.77
(-0.20) (2.48) (2.50)
Source: OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database.
of employment and of value added. What is more, a purely sectoral approach
seems to hide a good part of the same process, which a subsystem perspective
instead recovers.
While it might have been to a certain extent expected, which are the
causes of this deindustrialisation and, in particular, which is the scope of a
truly tertiarisation process for it, deserves special attention. Accordingly,
three possible explanations, in addition to that of tertiarisation, are addressed
in the following.
5.2 Deindustrialisation and producer services: how far do
they matter?
As we have seen in Section 2, increasingly more numerous are those contribu-
tions which contrast the deindustrialisation process with the increase of the
role of producer services and, on this basis, question an actual decrease of
the weight of manufacturing in modern developed economies. Our analysis
12
Table 4: Sectoral and subsystem shares of the OECD7 total economy (value
added, PPP weights)
early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary Sector 5.58 4.76 3.38 2.66
(-0.82) (-1.38) (-0.72)
Subsystem 2.09 1.96 1.61 1.30
(-0.13) (-0.35) (-0.31)
Manufacturing Sector 24.14 23.14 22.16 19.56
(-0.99) (-0.98) (-2.61)
Subsystem 29.57 28.82 26.98 22.86
(-0.75) (-1.84) (-4.12)
Public Utilities Sector 2.51 3.03 2.42 2.27
(0.52) (-0.61) (-0.15)
Subsystem 2.04 2.08 1.79 1.63
(0.05) (-0.29) (-0.17)
Construction Sector 7.06 6.00 6.61 5.86
(-1.06) (0.61) (-0.75)
Subsystem 12.01 10.68 11.01 9.47
(-1.32) (0.33) (-1.54)
Business services Sector 40.90 42.62 45.36 49.21
(1.72) (2.74) (3.85)
Subsystem 33.06 35.11 36.26 39.77
(2.05) (1.14) (3.51)
Non market services Sector 19.80 20.44 20.07 20.44
(0.64) (-0.38) (0.37)
Subsystem 21.24 21.34 22.35 24.97
(0.10) (1.01) (2.62)
Source: World Economic Outlook Database and OECD I-O Database.
does not entirely support this point of view. Although an increase of the
share accounted by business sector services in the manufacturing subsystem
is confirmed by our data – both in terms of employment (Table 5) and value
added (Table 6) – the decline of the manufacturing sector seems to be only
partially explained by it.
Consider, for example, what has happened in the OECD7 from the early
to the middle ’80s in terms of hours worked. While the manufacturing sector
decreased of as much as -1,451,119 hours worked, the correspondent subsystem
gained +9,470 hours worked (Table 2). This mismatch is partially explained
by the consistent increase (+1,315,548 hours worked) of the integration
of business services into manufacturing (Table 5(a)). Still, something else
should have occurred, given that the manufacturing subsystem share in the
total economy decreased anyway (-0.96 percentage points) (Table 3).
Similar mismatches can be found with respect to other periods, and also
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Table 5: Business sector services integration in the production system in the
OECD7 (hours worked)
(a) Business service employment in subsystems (absolute values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 1,351,668 1,336,592 1,367,255 1,421,716
(-15,077) (30,663) (54,461)
Manufacturing 27,036,126 28,351,675 29,977,849 31,049,241
(1,315,548) (1,626,174) (1,071,391)
Public Utilities 1,056,993 973,230 1,196,389 1,316,193
(-83,763) (223,159) (119,804)
Construction 11,872,229 10,824,500 13,084,453 12,962,725
(-1,047,729) (2,259,954) (-121,728)
Business services 128,922,953 144,538,685 158,133,652 173,288,046
(15,615,732) (13,594,967) (15,154,394)
Non market services 8,861,777 9,214,605 10,929,299 17,317,628
(352,827) (1,714,695) (6,388,329)
(b) Business service integration into subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6
Manufacturing 15.1 14.5 14.0 13.1
Public Utilities 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
Construction 6.6 5.5 6.1 5.5
Business services 72.0 74.0 73.7 73.0
Non market services 4.9 4.7 5.1 7.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(c) Share of business service employment in subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 9.7 10.6 11.6 14.2
Manufacturing 19.9 20.8 22.6 25.9
Public Utilities 22.6 22.5 25.8 28.8
Construction 20.1 19.0 21.2 21.2
Business services 87.3 87.8 89.3 89.0
Non market services 8.2 8.3 8.3 11.5
Source: OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database.
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Table 6: Business sector services integration in the production system in the
OECD7 (value added, PPP weights)
(a) Business sector services integration into subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 0.86 0.77 0.70 0.60
Manufacturing 15.58 15.05 14.68 12.49
Public Utilities 0.72 0.59 0.65 0.58
Construction 6.53 5.83 6.25 5.23
Business services 71.09 72.47 71.89 73.23
Non market services 5.22 5.29 5.82 7.86
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Share of business sector services in subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 17.52 18.36 19.95 23.43
Manufacturing 21.54 22.01 24.21 26.60
Public Utilities 15.10 12.49 16.70 17.80
Construction 22.17 23.33 25.53 27.03
Business services 87.84 87.96 90.14 90.83
Non market services 10.28 10.84 11.86 15.47
Source: World Economic Outlook Database and OECD I-O Database.
within the individual countries of our OECD7.13
In conclusion, producer services might have produced some differences in
the patterns of change between the manufacturing sector and the correspon-
dent subsystem, but the tendency toward the decline of manufactured goods
production seems to be more fundamental. In other words, its observed
decrease would have been surely greater without the increased integration of
business sector services, but the latter was not sufficient to counteract its
decline.
5.3 Is it manufacturing simply more integrated at the
subsystem level?
A different “impure” account of the observed deindustrialisation has to
do, as we have seen in Section 2, with the structural change implications
of the diffusion of ICTs. Also in this case, an actual deindustrialisation
hypothesis is questioned, but this time contrasted with the changing nature of
manufacturing, increasingly more representing the hardware for the software
13For the US, for example, this is traceable also with respect to the middle ’90s. The
relative tables have been omitted because of scope constraints, but are available from the
authors at request.
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Table 7: Manufacturing integration in the production system in the OECD7
(hours worked)
(a) Manufacturing employment in subsystems (absolute values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 795,797 779,164 667,844 541,867
(-16,633) (-111,320) (-125,977)
Manufacturing 81,971,395 81,945,607 80,672,788 71,757,410
(-25,788) (-1,272,818) (-8,915,378)
Public Utilities 498,204 401,015 409,070 359,813
(-97,189) (8,055) (-49,257)
Construction 10,507,969 9,596,263 10,138,078 9,846,569
(-911,706) (541,815) (-291,509)
Business services 7,446,497 7,327,251 7,699,889 8,862,190
(-119,245) (372,638) (1,162,301)
Non market services 4,959,887 4,679,328 4,864,715 5,870,781
(-280,559) (185,386) (1,006,067)
(b) Manufacturing sectors integration into subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Manufacturing 77.2 78.2 77.2 73.8
Public Utilities 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Construction 9.9 9.2 9.7 10.1
Business services 7.0 7.0 7.4 9.1
Non market services 4.7 4.5 4.7 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(c) Share of manufacturing employment in subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 5.7 6.2 5.7 5.4
Manufacturing 60.2 60.2 60.8 59.9
Public Utilities 10.6 9.3 8.8 7.9
Construction 17.8 16.8 16.4 16.1
Business services 5.0 4.4 4.4 4.6
Non market services 4.6 4.2 3.7 3.9
Source: OECD I-O Database and 60-Industries GGDC Database.
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Table 8: Manufacturing integration in the production system in the OECD7
(value added, PPP weights)
(a) Manufacturing sectors integration into subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 0.89 0.86 0.76 0.64
Manufacturing 77.16 78.32 77.69 74.70
Public Utilities 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.40
Construction 9.12 8.61 8.71 8.50
Business services 7.35 7.17 7.59 9.54
Non market services 4.94 4.54 4.78 6.23
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Share of manufacturing in subsystems (percentage values)
Subsystem early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Primary 11.03 10.81 10.81 9.92
Manufacturing 62.82 62.83 63.97 64.00
Public Utilities 6.42 5.52 5.76 4.78
Construction 17.98 18.33 17.34 17.51
Business services 5.31 4.72 4.62 4.58
Non market services 5.53 4.99 4.61 5.03
Source: World Economic Outlook Database and OECD I-O Database.
of immaterial services ICTs largely stand for. Given that this last wave of
technological progress has produced an intensive use of manufactured goods
for the provision of services (both market and non market ones), one might
be entitled to expect, ceteris paribus, an increase of the share manufacturing
sectors account for in the other subsystems, and in the service subsystem in
particular, both in terms of labour and value added.14
Such an expectation is however not confirmed by our OECD7. On the
contrary, the percentage share manufacturing accounts for of the market
and non-market services subsystems has in general decreased along the ’80s
and the middle ’90s, both in terms of hours worked (Table 7(c)) and value-
14It should be noted that, given that manufactured goods related to ICT are mainly
durable goods, and that input-output data do not include depreciation of fixed capital
goods among intersectoral flows, the reference to the subsystem level could underestimate
the actual integration of manufacturing in services, as well as the overall share of the
manufacturing subsystem. However, it is also true that, following SNA93, in most of
the countries included in our sample, also software related expenditures are included
as investments. Thus, as long as the depreciation of capital goods is not taken into
account, the integration of establishments providing such services in manufacturing is
underestimated too. Which is the more undervalued subsystem between the two is not so
obvious. However, as the percentage of the total cost due to software has progressively
increased with respect to the hardware in the last fifty years, that business service subsystem
has been underestimated even more than the manufacturing one could be at least suggested.
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added (Table 8(b)). The decrease over the retained period has been not
negligible, amounting for the overall service subsystem to 1.17 percentage
points in terms of hours worked and 1.22 points in terms of value added.
Quite interestingly, this decrease has occurred in the presence of an actual
increase in the integration of manufacturing in the service subsystems, as
the ICT hypothesis would suggest. This increase was quite consistent in
the first half of the 1990s: indeed, from the early to the middle ’90s, the
percentage of produced manufactured goods entering, directly and indirectly,
into the provision of services, both market and non-market, increased by
3 percentage points in terms of hours worked, and 3.4 points in terms of
value added (Tables 7(b) and 8(a)).15 As a consequence of this increased
integration, in the middle ’90s these shares were, respectively, 15.1% (Table
7(b)) and 15.77% (Table 8(a)), amounting to, respectively, 2.73% of the total
hours worked and 1.97% of the total value added in the OECD7. Still, as we
have said, an actual deindustrialisation should have occurred too, given that,
although in the presence of such an increased intregration, the service based
subsystems saw a decrease in the weight manufacturing has in them.
In conclusion, although the diffusion of ICTs, along with other causes,
determined an expected increased integration of manufacturing in services,
and this integration might have had important consequences for the produc-
tivity growth of the latter, notwithstanding, its impact in terms of labour
and value added was not so high to contrast an actual deindustrialisation
process.
5.4 What about international trade?
A last “impure” account of the observed deindustrialisation of the OECD7
could be found in the change occurred in the sectoral composition of the
trade-flows with respect to the correspondent economies. One might claim
that, going further the internal production flows retained by input-output
tables, the decline in the weight of internal manufacturing could have been
counteracted by an increase in the imports of foreign manufactured goods in
the OECD7, especially in the light of their increasing resort to offshoring
practices (Spencer, 2005).
The analysis of the trade balance of manufactured goods as a percentage
of country GDP for the OECD7 countries, still obtained by using PPP
weights, does not support this interpretation either. Indeed, in the OECD7
15It should be observed that the increase of manufacturing integration in business sector
services over the period was particularly marked in the USA: the country of the ICT
revolution. Indeed, from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s, the share accounted by the
market service subsystem in the manufacturing sector in terms of hours worked changed
from 7.59%, a value already above the OECD7 average (7.02%), up to 11.35%, while
the correspondent value for the OECD7 is 9.11% (Table 7(b)), and this is also reflected
in terms of value added. The tables for the US are not reported but available from the
authors at request.
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the trade balance of manufactured goods over the retained period was almost
always positive and, although a certain worsening can be detected, its impact
could be retained to have been limited (Figure 2): in the relevant period, the
average trade balance was not higher than 0.38% of GDP, spanning from
a maximum of 0.36%, in 1981, to a minimum of -0.02%, in 1988.16 More
precisely, if a negative trade balance of manufactured goods can be observed
with respect to the US, the positive one of Germany and Japan seem to
counterbalance it nearly completely, thus supporting our suggestion of a
quite integrated OECD area.
At first sight, therefore, also the recent changes occurred in the trade flows
and patterns of the investigated OECD countries are not able to contrast
what is emerging as an important result of the paper. Summing up, as far
as the production of manufactured goods is concerned, it seems reasonable
to conclude that, although these production processes remain undoubtedly
crucial in economic systems, their decline in terms of contribution to labour
employment and value creation is quite evident. Thus, deindustrialisation
might be regarded as a general tendency characterizing modern economies.
5.5 The other side of the coin: tertiarisation
As far as the other side of the deindustrialisation coin is concerned, that is
tertiarisation, in the OECD7 the share of services, as a whole, increased at
a higher rate at the subsystem than at the sectoral level, both in terms of
hours worked (9.34 vs. 8) and value added (10.44 vs. 8.94) (Tables 3 and 4).
As revealed by the relative share in the correspondent subsystems, this was
mainly due to the increased integration of business services in both market
and non market services (Tables 5 and 6).
Remarkable is the significant increase of the share of business sector
services in the non market service subsystem from the early to the middle
’90s, both in terms of hours worked (3.22 percentage points) and value added
(3.61 percentage points) (Tables 5(c) and 6(b)). As we have already noticed,
this is probably due to the increasing diffusion of contracting-out in the
public sector occurred in this period.17
More in general, the interplay between market and non market services
entailed by outsourcing practices has increased the “sensitivity” of input-
16This conclusion is consistent with Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997). Unlike their
study, we do not control for the impact of North-South trade on deindustrialisation, that
is, for the possibility that imports from less developed countries could be more labour
intensive than exports of more developed ones (Wood, 1994). However, it is worthwhile
noting that, although Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) do not find evidence of such
an impact, their analysis is carried out at the sectoral level, and the outcome could be
different at the subsystem level.
17In the case of the US, the pace of the integration increase is more stable and distributed
all along the period. This seems to support the idea that contracting-out practices of
public sector in the US have a longer history, going back at least to the early ’80s.
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Source: OECD STAN Database (2004) and World Economic Outlook Database (2005).
Figure 2: Trade balance of manufactured goods in OECD7 as a percentage
of GDP (PPP weights)
output tables to intermediate inputs of services for the provision of public
sector services. What was before a non-market service intended for inter-
mediate uses, and thus recorded by input-output tables as final demand, is
transformed by outsourcing into a business service, and thus registered as
intermediate input. This seems also the cause of the observed high growth of
the non-market service subsystem share with respect to the relative sectoral
share, mainly in terms of value added. In the overall period, the subsystem
share of non market services in the OECD7 increased by 4.78 percentage
points in terms of hours worked and by 3.73 points in terms of value added,
whereas the correspondent changes in the sectoral shares were, respectively,
2.2 and 0.64 points (Tables 3 and 4).
6 Conclusions
The main result this paper reaches is somehow at odds with what seems to
have become the new “consensus” about the “impure” deindustrialisation of
the learning economy.
The weight of manufacturing in the OECD(7) area actually decreased
from the early ’80s to the middle ’90s, in the sense that less hours are worked
and less value created in the production of manufactured goods than it
used to be in the early ’80s. Even after having controlled for a number
of “impure” accounts of deindustrialisation, which tend to relegate it to
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nothing but a different, possibly “lighter” industrialization era – namely,
either intensive of producer services or complementary to ICT services in a
software-hardware kind of relationship – “much” seems to remain unexplained
of the weight reduction of the OECD7 manufacturing sector and, even more,
of the manufacturing subsystem.
Although the appreciative nature of our application does not allow us
to establish “how much” this “much” actually is, we feel to have enough
elements to conclude that the DT hypothesis has not dead yet. Rather than
a simple re-organization of the manufacturing subsystem – as Italy appeared
to Momigliano and Siniscalco (1982a, 1986b,a) over the ’70s and the ’80s –
the OECD7 appears to us a truly less material and more intangible global
economy.
In parallel, this actual deindustrialisation appears accompanied by an
as much actual tertiarisation, though of a special kind. Indeed, the role of
services has increased mainly because, in the meantime, it has changed too.
The increasing integration of business services in the non-market service
subsystem is actually, also and above all, the result of the transformation
recently occurred in the organization of production, both in the private and
in the public sphere.
This is another extremely important result that the shift from a sectoral
to a subsystem level and the overcoming of the limiting national perspective
within which the analysis has been usually carried out at this level have
allowed us to capture. Once more, the notable B operator turns out useful
in detecting the actual extent of an economic phenomenon by retaining the
complexity of the direct and indirect relationships of the economic systems in
which it takes place: somehow paradoxically, although the conclusions they
reached for Italy more than twenty years ago are here reversed, Momigliano
and Siniscalco are still worthwhile reading!
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A Input-Output data coverage
Country Input-Output Tables
early ’80s mid-’80s early ’90s mid-’90s
Canada 1981 1986 1990 1997
Denmark 1980 1985 1990 1997
France 1980 1985 1990 1995
Germany 1986 1988 1990 1995
Japan 1980 1985 1990 1995
United Kingdom 1979 1984 1990 1998
United States 1982 1985 1990 1997
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